Iraq

How the Terrorists Won

And Other Uplifting Stories from the 21st Century

Hello, Internet. It’s been a while.

Well, let’s get to it.


So, let’s indulge certain world leaders and acknowledge at face value that there is a literal “war” on “terror.” Terror, of course, being a poetic substitution for “terrorism.”

In 2003 the US government released its “National Strategy for Combating Terrorism.” In it is outlined the national strategy for “victory” against terrorism. The primary goal is stated as this:

“to stop terrorist attacks against the United States, its citizens, its interests, and our friends and allies around the world and ultimately, to create an international environment inhospitable to terrorists and all those who support them”

According to the report, there are four intermediate objectives required in order to accomplish this.
1. Defeat terrorists
2. Deny them sponsorship and support
3. Diminish the conditions which engender terrorism
4. Defend the security of our interests at home and abroad

Now aside from the clear hard-on for ‘D’s here alliterated, what do you notice 12 years later?
1. Terrorists are more proliferated now than when we invaded Iraq in 2003.
2. Terrorists enjoy increased support from around the world, including from our own alleged allies like Kuwait, as well as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and China.
3. The Middle east has become exponentially more unstable, with civil conflict among many states creating prime conditions for breeding more extremism.
4. We have suffered through the Boston Bombing, the attack on the US embassy in Benghazi, and numerous terrorist attacks upon our allies in the Middle East and the European Union.

In other words, every single objective of this strategy has failed. I’ve talked previously about how the attack on Iraq itself counter-intuitively encouraged this failure. But Al Queda, too, had a strategy, although of course it was for the advancement of terrorism.

In 2005, Saif al-Adel, al Qaeda’s military commander at the time, revealed Al Queda’s 7-point strategy for the 21st century.
1. “The awakening,” 2000-2003, in which the 9/11 attacks were the first wave. The purpose of this phase was to provoke the US into declaring war on the Muslim world.
2. “Opening Eyes,” 2004-2006, in which Iraq is converted into a hotbed for terrorist activity and an active way-station and base for recruits.
3. “Arising and Standing Up,” 2007-2010, plans for an increase in terrorist activities, especially attacks against more stable Middle eastern nations like Israel and Jordan, with a particular emphasis on Syria.
4. For the years of 2010-2013, Al Queda planned to bring about the end of dictatorial governments in the Middle East, like those of Syria and Egypt, as well as undermining the US economy using cyber-terrorism.
5. Between 2013-2016, Al Queda hopes for a literal establishment of the “Islamic State,” or caliphate, wherein the Western image will be weakened so much that support for Islamic fundamentalism will rise exponentially.
6. From 2016 onwards, the new “Islamic State” will provoke or inflict national violence against “non-believers” in the pursuit of enforcing Muslim beliefs on the entire region.
7. Al Queda foresees victory in 2020, after a two-year war in which the Western world finally admits defeat by the Muslims of the Middle East and, presumably, withdraws totally from both overt and covert capacities.

It’s sobering to remember that this was released in 2005, and had probably been in the works for at least half a decade. While some objectives are, generously, a pipe dream by terrorism defined as Al Queda alone, expanding the objectives to encompass all terrorist activity shows where the organization possessed startling prescience.
1. It goes without saying that the 9/11 attacks worked. The US invaded Afghanistan, and then Iraq, with the predictable result of getting stuck there for more than ten years.
2. Iraq has been completely destabilized, and Al Queda in Iraq, ISIS, and other terrorist organizations which were nonexistent under Saddam’s regime now flourish.
3.-4. Al Queda’s third and fourth phases eerily predict the Arab Spring and ensuing end to, or challenge of, dictatorial regimes in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen, as well as their emphasized focus on Syria, where Al Nusra Front and ISIS (both local outgrowths of Al Queda)  have made significant, well-publicized gains since 2010. The economic defeat of the United States precluded any need for cyber-terrorism, as its own military adventure served the same objective, and with little need for effort on the part of Al Queda.
5. The name of “ISIS”, or Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, is predicted. While the group exists more as a guerrilla force than a government entity, it’s startling to realize that its existence is owed in no small part to the plans and predictions of Al Queda ten years prior. The US’s predictions for Iraq and Afghanistan ten years ago were significantly less astute.
6. Although this phase is planned for the future, there’s already evidence that ISIS’s designs include such activities, and has begun to encourage them.
7. It’s hard to say what exactly will be the case in 2020, but the future isn’t looking particularly bright.

Strategy, independent of tactics, determines the victor in war. Strategy is more than a simple prediction of victory, but a description of the means to achieve victory in terms which can be interpreted broadly, but implemented specifically. As such, there is some leeway in judging the success or failure of each strategy in the Middle East, and around the world.

Unfortunately, it’s hard to say that the strategy of defeating terrorism has had any success. If anything, the US’s means of achieving that goal has actually contributed to its own defeat. Invasions and military actions in the Middle East have inflamed an already unstable region, united opinion against us, and crippled our own economy, which has resulted in an unprecedented rise in terrorism around the world.

For terrorism, US activity has been a boon, as has been the growing animosity to Muslims around the world. Western reactions and backlashes to these activities, exhibited in the rise of right-wing ideology engendered by terrorist activities, increasingly isolates and radicalizes Muslims domestically and abroad. This leads to greater recruitment of terrorists, as more Muslims see solidarity in joining with those who oppose increasingly reactionary Western governments and populations.

This, like the US and the Middle East, like Israel and Palestine, is yet another recursive loop of foreign policy, where so-called enlightened powers play into the most bold-faced and basic guerrilla strategies of extremists without recourse to real international political or economic pressure. Throughout the course of the war on terror, we have framed victory as a mere matter of search-and-destroy, and of exporting our ideas to other countries in an attempt to stabilize in one lifetime what centuries have wrought, as though those countries could not survive without our wisdom or guidance.

The truth that has emerged is that these very strategies bring about more terrorism. And if our war on terror has simply sewn more terror, what can be done? Clearly we need a new strategy. I am sick and tired of seeing these same strategies, the same tactics, used again and again by the United States, in the name of high-minded ideals like freedom and democracy, when in actuality our actions serve only to engender further animosity abroad by representing us in the most myopic and unenlightened possible light.

I have an alternative strategy to propose. It’s not a simple fix, and it is unlikely ever to be implemented, but I believe if we do not significantly change the course of this country, it will be a footnote before long, a tragic tale of the rise and fall of the first, and last, global democracy.

Wut

So in my last post, I began with an extended quotation from Osama Bin Laden, and then neglected to point out why I had chosen to do so, on the 13th anniversary of 9/11. I’m going to address that, first.

That quote was taken from a transcript of a speech given to Al Jazeera in 2004. I would hazard to guess that many have already forgotten this, but there was a time when Osama Bin Laden was considered Pure Evil. Pure Evil to the extent where unironically fantasizing about his death on the presumption of inherent justice was pretty much a means of acceptable, national, self-gratification.

The man Bin Laden reveales himself to be in the statement was far more complex than a Saturday morning cartoon villain. He is cunning, even prescient, and though the strategy of his statement was certainly self-serving, there were also hard, essential truths to be found in his words. But America was not shown that man. We were not encouraged to understand who he was, or how he was made, or why he fought. We were simply told that Osama Bin Laden is evil, so he must be killed.

Aspersion of that caliber ideally necessitates a presentation of compelling proof. The 9/11 attacks were horrific, but even Bin Laden admits that they were. However, Bin Laden portrays the attacks as retaliatory for oppression perpetrated by the United States in the Middle East. Specifically, he accuses the United States of aiding Israel in the 1982 Lebanon war, in which 5,000-8,000 civilian non-Jews were killed both by Israeli forces, and the ensuing unrest unleashed by Israeli intervention.

This of course is at best a misunderstanding of the situation, and at worst a deliberate lie, as the U.S.’s role in the Lebanese war was relatively minor. However, its financial and military assistance to Israel is, of course, well-known. If the implication is that US support for Israel engenders the latter’s bold and reckless behavior in the Middle East, which has unarguably caused the death and displacement of many non-Israeli civilians, that implication is more or less correct.

In other words, Bin Laden’s argument is essentially this: Allied lives are threatened by a foreign power, and in retaliation, we will attack at the source of the nation that threatens us. There will be unavoidable civilian deaths and that is regrettable, but necessary, in order to hasten the results we desire, and when the adversary refuses to commit to any sort of military integrity.

I find that argument abhorrent, and most probably would, knowing its source in this particular instance. However, it is a similar argument echoed by US presidents and Israel itself.

It is also the same argument that underpins the bombings of Germany (300,000-600,000 civilians killed) and Japan (330,000-500,000 civilians killed), as well as much of Vietnam (50,000-180,000 civilians killed), Cambodia, and Laos, not to mention Iraq (100,000 plus civilian deaths, though not all from bombing). There is a fundamental hypocrisy at play here, where provoking attrition warfare against the United States is “evil,” but engaging in a war of attrition in the Middle East and elsewhere can be “noble” and “necessary.”

Of course, Bin Laden himself benefited from the sort of US military aid that Israel has enjoyed for decades, so he is, himself, also a hypocrite. Yet even the narrative of Bin Laden alongside the Mujahideen fighting Soviets in Afghanistan, supported enthusiastically by the Carter and Reagan administrations, is absent from the national narrative on the factors leading to 9/11.

To many now, that lazy explanation of the 9/11 attacks as a mere “act of evil” is as good as historical accuracy. Thirteen years after 9/11, America does not understand who the enemy behind 9/11 was.

Between the government and most media outlets, there has been little to no effort to faithfully characterize and analyze America’s enemies and why they fight. Undoubtedly there is more to their motivations than “being evil,” and to reduce any organization to those two words is a disservice not only to the people being mobilized to fight, but to the victims created by the engines of war once they are running at full steam. “Fundamentalist” and “extremist” are not sober rallying cries for war. Sure, extremism embodies zealousness to the point of what most would call “evil,” yet zealousness itself is not an engine upon which any serious threat can move when modern militaries scour space with satellites while straddling the globe… right?

Looking upon the build up (again) to what increasingly looks like Desert Storm III, I have a hard time dredging up the energy to feel as incensed and angry as seems appropriate. The painful lesson of “Operation Iraqi Freedom” is still stained into the national fabric of America, and the degree to which the road to war against ISIS parallels that of previous historical blunders is positively stupefying. How can the entire country not recoil from this immediately? Haven’t we been through this before? Doesn’t anyone remember how we got here? How can so many people accept such insanity with straight faces?

ISIS, like Bin Laden and Al Queda, is not well understood, and certainly no effort has been made to comprehensively explain the group, its roots, or its motivations to the American people.

Let’s take a look at ISIS, again. The strategy of letting ISIS burn itself out and bolstering Iran in order to combat it have been echoed by others since my first post on the matter, but it’s clear the Obama administration has other, more traditional designs. The sorts of designs that have been tried before, with no evidence of success.

I originally intended to describe ISIS’s origins as a rebellion against the oppressive regime in Syria, grown out of Al Queda in Syria like an unwanted, mutant limb and armed by the United States against what was perceived as a common enemy in Bashar al-Assad. Oh yeah, remember Assad? The evil dictator alleged to use chemical weapons on his own people, the one Obama (surprisingly) asked permission from congress to attack last year?

Oh, how the tables have turned.

I don’t know what the point is in even bothering to wrap my head around this anymore. It’s so ridiculous I almost don’t want to make sense of it all, at the risk of becoming crazy through the attempt alone.

Yet, I must. I’m going to try to get this straight.

The United States intervenes in the Middle East, arming militants against a rival regime in Afghanistan. Those militants go on to radicalize as they fragment into an extremist group that would later be known as Al Queda. Al Queda begins trying to attack the US and its allies in retaliation for US intervention in the Middle East. The US eventually responds by intervening in the Middle East, while it simultaneously arms militants fighting a rival regime who would later exploit the conditions of US intervention whilst radicalizing into an extremist group that would later be known as ISIS. ISIS begins trying to attack the US and its allies. And now, the president of the United States is proposing to re-intervene while arming more “friendly” militants in the hopes that this will be the act of intervention that somehow reverses everything that came before it.

Nope. Still seems as insane as before. The only appropriate question that remains in light of the inanity on display is, “Wut?”

Ukraine: Joining a Long Line of Incidents Feared, Now Forgotten

Ohhh yeah, Ukraine! Remember Ukraine? Yeah, that little country that “almost triggered World War III” a couple months ago. Hah. Yeah.

I’ll confess with ISIS, or ISIL, or whatever people are calling it today, I’ve not been immune to the frenetic, distracted focus of news media ADD. It’s been hard to stay heavily invested with the Ukraine incident, especially with hilariously irrelevant dinosaurs rising from their tar beds to weigh in with “sage” advice on how/not to proceed in Iraq. If current events are entertainment, and the twenty-four-hour news cycle certainly perpetuates that concept, then this has been a blockbuster year.

This blog is fairly new, so all three of the people reading weren’t subjected to my views on Ukraine when it was “relevant.” It’s safe to say now that Ukraine is not the site of the next Assassination of Archduke Ferdinand, or the next Invasion of Poland, but Ukraine is still relevant. Granted, if the United States and NATO had a memory worth speaking of it might not be, and that’s more or less the issue I’d like to address.

While people were invoking Austria-Hungary and Poland, the boiling incident in Ukraine reminded me of something more recent: the Cuban Missile Crisis. Here was an incident where a tiny neighbor of a huge major power threatened to join a military alliance that disproportionately endangered the neighboring major power. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, that threat was armament with missiles capable of destroying American cities. This year in Ukraine, it was possible admission to NATO.

Military force was absolutely an option considered, strongly, by the Kennedy administration confronting Cuba’s armament. If the United States attacked Cuba, there is little doubt it would have lead to nuclear war. It was the prospect of this World War III that stayed Kennedy’s hand, just as Khrushchev observed similar caution. The United States and the Soviet Union had a lot to lose from Mutually Assured Destruction, but there were points where such a catastrophe seemed inevitable, and truly, small decisions made differently could have provoked just such a result. In the end, cooler heads happened to prevail.

The same reason that makes the Cuban Missile Crisis such a success is the reason why it is ignominious. It was not a great military victory, or a pronounced diplomatic success that resulted in a severe blow to the Soviet Union and prestige for the U.S. abroad. It was a dodged bullet. It was a visceral reminder of what the Cold War could, and in many respects, should have lead to, which was utter and complete annihilation. The Cuban Missile crisis was a non-event because the best possible result was a return to the status quo.

America has a tendency to forget these moments, these points in history where the United States has faced defeat, or where it has confronted the realities of policies that it willfully perpetuates. When the 9/11 attacks were committed, and the name of Osama Bin Laden rose again to the public consciousness, few remembered that CIA agents in Afghanistan funded the Mujahideen in Operation Cyclone, arming and equipping men who would go on to be known later by the name of “Al Queda.”

By 2003, talk quickly turned to an invasion of Iraq. Yet there were few conversations about the role of Donald Rumsfeld, then Secretary of Defense, in assisting Saddam Hussein two decades earlier on behalf of Ronald Reagan.

These are not secret, shadowy conspiracy theories cauterized from public record by an army of Hydra-esque footsoldiers working for the New World Order. This stuff is on the internet, in encyclopedias, it’s been on the news. The NSA thing is still fairly recent, so there’s not much excuse for Americans to claim ignorance about these incredibly important incidents of myopic hubris in American history.

Most Americans can tell you how the US “kicked Hitler’s ass” in World War II, or how it trounced foreign soldiers to gain independence from Great Britain in 1783 (though they may remember the year as 1776). Most will remember the startling blitzkrieg of Operation Desert Storm (one, that needs to be numbered now), and some may even remember how the U.S. viciously screwed over Mexico.

What about the Korean War?

The War of 1812?

Then there’s Vietnam. While remembered much more than, say, Korea, it would be a lie to say it is analyzed or studied with anywhere near the enthusiasm or joyful scrutiny of World War II. Remember that, because I’m going to jump back in a second. For now let’s return to the subject of Ukraine.

Putin has backed off. Ukraine is now just another distant country in another civil war that we, from the safe distance afforded by most of a continent and a generous ocean, can ignore while watching the World Cup. There were important lessons to be learned from Ukraine. For one thing, it demonstrated that Putin is every bit as human and vulnerable as Khrushchev was in 1962. Despite his bellicose calls for violence, economic and political pressure got him to back down. The Russian cub reborn in 1992 is growing, but it still realizes it’s not ready to fight with the Bulldogs and Eagles. That will change, but for now it enforces a current analyses of the US and its allies as the most powerful force on Earth, at least so far. Still, Putin got the part of Ukraine, just as he got part of Georgia in 2008. One would be remiss not to recognize these as a disturbing pattern of concession.

The incident in Ukraine has also demonstrated that NATO continues to be a source of conflict. As Russia and China continue to grow in power and influence, the Cold War relic will likely continue to cause friction in the future. For now, NATO continues to justify its own existence, somehow. In the future, it may be more of a liability than an asset, if it isn’t already.

These may seem like small lessons, but they have great implications. Putin is going to stay in power for a long time, and his behavior under these circumstances grants a valuable look into his political methods and priorities. The U.S. and E.U. came very close to open conflict with Putin, and such a conflict could spark in earnest sometime in the future. Any information that could prevent such incidents from occurring again should be valued highly and remembered well.

I doubt, however, that America will remember. There have been huge mistakes, grievous mistakes, made because America has not remembered. I hope this will demonstrate what I mean.

A man, some would call him infamous though he was certainly highly intelligent, analyzed a fairly recent historical incident with which he was intimately familiar and came to these astute conclusions:

1. We misjudged the geopolitical intentions of [the enemy], and exaggerated the dangers to the US of their actions.

2. We viewed the people and leaders of [the country we intervened in] in our own experience.

3. We underestimated the power of [an ideology] to motivate a people to fight and die for their beliefs and values.

4. We were profoundly ignorant of the history, culture, and politics of the people in the area.

5. We failed to recognize the limitations of modern, high-tech military equipment, forces, and doctrine.

6. We failed to draw Congress and the American people into a full and frank discussion and debate of the pros and cons of becoming involved in large-scale military engagement in [the region of conflict].

7. We did not explain fully what was happening and why we were doing what we did. We failed to maintain national unity.

8. We failed to recognize that neither our people nor our leaders are omniscient. We do not have the God-given right to shape every nation in our own image or as we choose.

9. We erred in taking unilateral military action not supported by multinational forces and the international community.

10. We failed to recognize that in international affairs there may be problems for which there are no immediate solutions.

11. We failed to organize the top echelons of the executive branch to deal effectively with the extraordinarily complex range of issues at hand.

Iraq? No.

I was sneaky and made some omissions; you can find the original list here, from Robert McNamara’s In Retrospect.

That book was published in 1996, after thirty years of opportunity for analysis. McNamara was not a singular genius, and thanks to the Pentagon Papers, he did not have exclusive access to the only pertinent details that might reveal hidden truths about Vietnam. He was not the only person aware of these lessons, nor the only one capable of forming these conclusions. All it required was an interest in remembering history and a desire to learn from past mistakes.

On a global scale, Ukraine has lost its bid for historic significance, and has rejoined what most Americans consider a kind of poorly-understood cloud of obscurity most countries in the world fall under if they don’t directly provide us with military alliances, oil, and commercial goods, or share our language. Few Americans think about Cuba or Vietnam anymore, either. Ukraine could have been World War III or another Afghanistan. It happened to be a bullet we dodged. These incidents are not random happenstance, befalling our innocent nation. The U.S. is responsible, at least indirectly, for many of the conflicts in the world today. We may not have fired the bullet, but we provided the motivation to fire it, and NATO provided the ammunition.

It’s beyond trite nowadays to utter the oft-quoted phrase, “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it,” but it is a perfectly valid observation. America refuses to remember, and miraculously, while it has suffered the consequences, it has escaped doom time and again. Maybe we’re just lucky.

Luck can’t hold forever.

Iran: America’s Best Ally in Iraq

Before I begin, gonna get this out of the way; Iran isn’t the best country, let alone a perfect country. Sure, “neither is the United States,” but Iran is even further from perfect than that. That is not to say that they are an immature or backwards country. Iran’s culture and history stretch back thousands of years. They actually were doing pretty well for themselves until the U.S. and Britain decided the country shouldn’t be allowed to keep the revenues from its own oil sales. But that’s another story. The point is, Iran isn’t a cluster of radical Jihadist cells trying to develop a dirty bomb as some would have you believe. Iran is modernizing, urbanizing, and generally working towards a share in the level of economic and technological prosperity enjoyed by most of the Western world.

Iran is also, importantly, fairly stable. There was that famous hiccup a few decades ago (mostly due to the blowback of US intervention), but as the twenty-first century has dragged on through recessions and Arab Springs, Iran has not become increasingly radical and authoritarian, threatening to devolve into revolutionary chaos. It’s slowly, gradually, evolving into a more moderate state.

Again, I will not propose that Iran is or will soon become a beacon of “enlightened” western-style democracy. But in the present situation with ISIS, looking at Iraq (and ways out of it), the United States doesn’t exactly have a buffet of options. It can re-engage militarily, or it can ease the burden onto a regional ally invested in Iraq’s future. Military re-engagement obviously isn’t a solution. If after ten years of military efforts this stuff is still happening, it should be obvious the military option isn’t a solution. We can’t do “nothing,” or at least, it would be morally irresponsible. So who can we ease the burden onto? The only neighbor with the power, regional influence, and a self-interested motivation to effectively aid Iraq is Iran.

It goes without saying that the consequence of the military adventure in Iraq has been… mixed, but I’ll elaborate first to avoid begging the question. One of the worst results of the 2003 invasion was sectarian violence, sparked by members of the Shia majority which, under Saddam, was suppressed by the Sunni minority. After “democracy” was established, the majority Shia not only had the tactical capability, but the historical motivation for aggression upon the Sunni minority. Shia death squads emerged which essentially acted as a state-sanctioned mafia, driving Sunnis out of their cities and homes so that they could be occupied by Shia. Al Queda in Iraq (AQI) gained traction among the Sunni population by exploiting these crimes and posing themselves as the counterweight to Shia aggression. On top of the logistical nightmare of rebuilding a modern, functioning society in Iraq, the US had the profound military challenge of decreasing violence in the country, when it was caused both by terrorists and by sectarian civil warfare. It took ten years for the US to effectively marginalize AQI, and that was largely with the initiative taken by local populations who identified AQI as outsiders invading their country, and fought back.

ISIS itself, by the standards of a conventional military, is not a threat. At most 10,000 strong, it is currently drunk on its success in overrunning weak positions and racing towards Baghdad. This is blitzkrieg maneuvering, on the level of the Third Reich’s opening bid to claim Europe. However, ISIS is still a terror group, not a national army. They do not have the forces or logistical capability to take and hold territory, or to police it as a government authority, for a long period of time. They also have yet to fight a national army of any modern caliber of capability. If they do reach Baghdad, it is the most well-defended city in Iraq, not least of all because it is the seat of government power and authority, and if Iraq’s current ministry understands anything, it’s self-preservation. If ISIS attacks Baghdad, they will trigger a military response that will overwhelm them. In fact, the military response is already beginning. Sooner or later, ISIS will be defeated. That’s when the problem truly begins.

The attempt at conventional maneuver thwarted, ISIS will revert to using guerrilla tactics: infiltrating local populations, using hit-and-fade, sniper attacks, car bombs, all of those things which require few personnel but can cause significant damage. On top of being the serpent’s head which replaces that of AQI, there is also AQI, bloodied but not beaten, and the sectarian divides that continue to exist and fuel both organizations. It is a fantasy to assume military intervention will magically wave all of those factors away when it took ten years to get Iraq to this level of security and stability.

So, let’s look at the other option: sponsoring another nation to help stabilize Iraq. Much of the Middle East, from Egypt to Yemen, is consumed by the final throes of the Arab Spring, or its immediate results (a brutal Arab Summer?). Also, much of the Middle East falls on the Sunni side of Sunni-Shia relations, including ISIS, which predicates much of its justification with the unfair treatment of Sunnis in Iraq, one of few countries in the world with a Shia majority. Also among those countries? Iran.

Iran and Iraq have had a complicated relationship, to put it gently. Iran has done everything from waging war against Iraq to supporting terrorists against its post-Saddam government. That Iran has even considered aiding Iraq is surprising—but not that surprising. Iran recognizes that ISIS is not just a threat to Iraq and Syria (both bordering countries), but to the stability of the entire Middle East. Iraq’s government must be a nightmare to deal with now, but imagine if Iran had to contend with a large, unstable neighbor with large swaths of territory and resources along its border controlled by violently anti-Shia terrorists, when Iran is a mostly-Shia nation. An unstable Iraq is a risk to Iran’s security, economy, and simply any positive expectations for its own future. Whatever happens in Iraq in the long term is an immediate concern for Iran.

Large swaths of Mexico have been commandeered by violent drug cartels. Do you think the US is content to let its large, close southern neighbor fall to chaos? Spoiler alert: no. Is there any end in sight? Not really, but you can bet that at no point will the US give up the effort and hope the problem solves itself. The actions of those drug cartels directly affect the United States, making them a direct threat until they’re successfully marginalized or eliminated. That isn’t going to happen any time soon, so we’re in it for the long haul.

Iran is not an evil villain, content to sit back and watch the Middle East burn. They’re even more concerned with Iraq than we in the US are, because after we finally leave, they’re the ones who have to deal with the consequences. If there are problems (there will be big problems), they will be the only ones left to act on them.

I say, why not seize this opportunity for reconciliation? Iran is moving up in the world, and it’s certainly not thanks to the US. We can continue with a hawkish condemnation of the country for events that, ultimately, we caused, or we can bury the hatchet and move forward, recognize Iran as a legitimate nation, and maybe even formally apologize(?). Their domestic policies are, surely, a concern, but we will not democratize the world in a day, and certainly not by force. China has grown internationally by almost exclusively using a doctrine of what is called “soft power:” political assistance and inclusion extended to other countries to enhance its own reputation. Surprisingly, reaching out to other countries on friendly terms has vastly expanded China’s influence, without them needing to establish extravagant military bases or pummel other parties into submission. I’m not going to say that China’s perfect either, but there’s certainly a lesson to be learned here. The entire mess in Iraq was a result of the assumption that the US knows what’s best; the US’s global position has worsened dramatically as a result. By now it’s clear we need to suck up our pride, recognize we’re not the center of the universe, and treat other countries as equals. Iran’s a good place to start.